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Emergency response efforts usually involve several teams from different agencies who are 
working to save lives or property. It is becoming more usual that the commander 
responsibilities are being performed in a context of multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional 
response. This paper explores the interdisciplinary collaboration between emergency response 
leaders. This is done through examining to which extent a practical check-list and a 
theoretical model of interdisciplinary collaboration were able to account for interview 
statements from operative leaders in the three emergency units in Norway regarding 
collaboration Semi-structured interviews were performed with 17 operational leaders with 
experience from working in Incident Command Post (ICP). Based on a mixed-model 
approach, the interviews were transformed into quantitative data and analyzed in SPSS. The 
results revealed that neither the practical frameworks nor the theoretical model were able to 
account for all the statement. When the two frameworks were combined they accounted for 
1516 of the 1649 statements that were identified in this study. The 133 remaining statements 
were analyzed with the help of a content analysis, which identified 6 new categories. This 
implies that a framework for collaboration in the emergency response domain cannot be based 
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Terrorist attacks and natural disasters have brought considerable attention to the role 
government agencies must play in maintaining national security. In recent years, several 
countries in the world have been severely affected by natural disasters and extreme weather 
situations. From 1970 to 2010, There has been a gradual increase in the number of natural 
disasters in the world.  In 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit the coast of Louisiana with a wind 
speed of over 260 km / hour and about 1 300 people died (Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet 
og beredskap, 2011). In 2004 when an earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean affected 
more than ten countries and over 280,000 were killed (Ekerberg, Skogstad, & Myhrer, 2008). 
There have also been an increasing number of natural events in Norway, such as Gudrun in 
2005 and Dagmar at the end of 2011. Terror attacks like September 11 in New York, the 
London bombings of 2005 and the terrorist attacks in Madrid, March 2004 contributed to an 
increased focus on rescue and emergency preparedness in relation to extreme events in 
Norway (Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap, 2004). With the terror attacks in 
Norway this became even more important. Even though this is relevant for the topic, this will 
not be discussed in detailed in this thesis.  
It is important to understand how to respond as Norway faces a growing number of major 
incidents in the form of terrorism, natural disasters and technical accidents. Large scale 
incidents are according to Flin (1996) different from routine incidents in many ways. She 
describes large scale incidents as incidents involving limited control, sometimes extending 
over a large area with long time duration and larger risks. These situations often necessitate 
multiple agencies working together and sharing information with other agencies. There has 
been few large scale incidents in Norway up until now (Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og 
beredskap, 2012), which has given the incident personnel limited experience with large-scale 
operations. There is a need in Norway, as the rest of the world, to prepare for the increasing 
number of large scale incidents. But in order to recognize how these emergency units handle 
emergency situations in Norway it is a necessity to understand how they collaborate and how 
they are organized.  
This paper will therefore describe how the emergency response agencies in Norway 
collaborate with each other and how they are organized. This will be presented through theory 
and two frameworks; firstly the organization of the emergency services and a practical 
framework based on an incident management checklist is presented. Secondly theory about 
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collaboration between several agencies is presented and a theoretical model that explains the 
necessary elements for an effective interdisciplinary collaboration is presented. 
The Norwegian rescue service. The rescue service in Norway is not made up by one 
organization, but is a function carried out through collaboration between several agencies, and 
is a combination of government agencies, NGOs and private companies that have the 
appropriate resources (Høringsutgave av Håndbok for redningstjenesten, 2008). Collaboration 
between emergency response units has so far received relatively little scientific attention, 
despite its obvious significance (Rui Chen, Sharman, Chakravarti, Rao, & Upadhyaya, 2008). 
According to McGuire (2006) multi-organizational collaboration is often arranged as a 
reaction to problems that are not easily solved by single organizations. In this paper 
collaboration is defined as: “When a group of autonomous stakeholders of a problem domain 
engage in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms, and structures, to act or decide on 
issues related to that domain” (Wood & Gray, 1991, p. 146). Collaboration increases the 
likelihood of good decisions (Kerr, 2004), reduces the risk of human error (Reason, 2000) and 
provides multiple approaches to the given situation (Aboelela et al., 2007). Rescue service is a 
priority for the emergency units although some of them daily perform other tasks ("St.meld. 
nr. 17 (2001-2002) Samfunnssikkerhet," 2012). Even though the emergency units collaborate 
in the incident response, the different emergency units have their own areas of 
responsibilities.  
The roles and responsibilities are organized by the principles of similarity, responsibility 
and equality. Ambulance personnel have the main responsibility for the patients and the fire 
department focuses on technical rescue tasks. The police have the main responsibility for the 
incident management, coordination management and security. The agencies have different 
education, training, equipment and procedures. The agencies manuals, curricula, rules of 
thumb and mindset are also different. Yet they all have a common goal: to save lives 
(Vigerust, Andersen, & Vollebæk, 2009). This common goal includes different things for the 
different departments. For the police it might be securing a scene or stopping violent acts, and 
for the health department might include preform first aid or transporting patients to a hospital. 
The task of saving lives is too complex for one department to handle alone (Håndbok for 
redningstjenesten, 2008). It is therefore often necessary for several agencies to collaborate, 
each offering some expert contribution to the rescue operation (Wimpfheimer, Bloom, & 
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Kramer, 1991). This creates a need for someone to take the lead and coordinate the units at 
the incident site. 
The incident management usually consists of an incident commander from the police, 
operational commander fire and an operational leader health. The incident commander is 
responsible for organizing, managing and coordinating the work at the incident area. In 
Norway the incident commander responsibility is given to the police (with some exceptions 
(Politidirektoratet, 2011)).  Their responsibility is primarily facilitation of the professional 
efforts and coordination of resources and support. The incident manager should, in other 
words, not command the professional efforts of the fire department and the health department. 
To ensure the collaboration between the three emergency units, the incident commander 
together with the operational commanders from the health and fire department are gathered in 
an Incident Command Post (ICP) (Politidirektoratet, 2011).  
In light of the increase in large and complex events, there is a need for increased 
interdisciplinary collaboration. In order to understanding the collaboration between the 
Norwegian emergency a practical cheek list developed based on standard operational 
procedures is presented.  
Standard Operational Procedure  
This section will explain the concept of standard operational procedures, and then 
present a proposal for a common operational procedure made by the Norwegian Air 
Ambulance. The operational procedures presented by the Norwegian Air Ambulance includes 
six phases and a list of eight categories of actions that shod be performed at the incident area.  
Standard operational procedures guide the operational effort when the operational 
leaders work together in ICP. These cheek lists are essentially a list of tasks to be solved 
(Chen, 2008). The procedures are tools that might help them to start an effective and focused 
initial effort. A general tendency within crisis management is to recommend common 
strategies, plans and operational procedures (McConnell & Drennan, 2006). 
FORSTÅTT 
The three emergency units (fire, health and police) are the agencies that most 
frequently work together in Norway. The various agencies all have their own standard 
operational procedures, but they share a common main goal; to saving life. Although different 
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agencies have fairly similar views on what must be done in the area of deployment, they use 
different language and terms which can make communication and collaboration difficult.  
The Norwegian Air Ambulance has developed a set of common operating procedures 
for the three emergency units in Norway. This common operational procedure is called 
“FORSTÅTT” and explains the common tasks at the site of deployment (Vigerust et al., 
2009). These procedures were developed as part of the interdisciplinary emergency medicine 
collaboration courses (TAS) offered by the Norwegian Air Ambulance and were based on the 
manuals and procedures that already exist in the different agencies.  FORSTÅTT looks at the 
operation period in chronological order with regard to various common processes to be 
initiated at different stages within the operation. The FORSTÅTT check-list is result-driven, 
and the goal of these procedures is to create a shared operational language and to increase 
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The FORSTÅTT check-list are sequential, and listed as necessary actions within 
phases. FORSTÅTT consist of eight elements and six phases that can help the emergency 
personnel preform a common rescue operation. FORSTÅTT is an acronym for the Norwegian 
words for the eight elements in the procedure; Preparation (Forberedelse), Information, 
Deployment, Organization/leadership (Opplysninger, oppmarsj og organisering/ledelse), Risk 
Assessment, Reconnaissance, Resources (Risikovurdering, rekognosering og ressurser), 
Securing, Situation Report (Sikring og situasjonsforståelse), Triage (prioritizing) (Triage),  
Management of the site (Åstedshåndtering), Measures on Patient (Tiltak på pasient), 
Transportation to Hospital (Transport til sykehus). 
In Vigerust et al. (2009) the elements of FORSTÅTT is described as steps in the 
phases. The phases are presented here as they are important as a context for the elements in 
FORSTÅTT, but they will not be used further in this paper. Next the elements of the 
FORSTÅTT cheek-list are described one by one. 
The six phases of the procedures are; the first phase is the preparation phase, this 
phase includes the F (Preparation) and includes everything they do to be prepared before the 
alarm goes off. Secondly there is the call-out phase; this phase includes both the F 
(Preparation) and the O (Information, Deployment, Organization/leadership) elements in the 
FORSTÅTT check-list. The third phase is the emergency phase which is where they try to get 
control of the situation, and includes the O (Information, Deployment, 
Organization/leadership), R (Risk Assessment, Reconnaissance, Resources) and S (Securing, 
Situation Report). The operation phase is when things are starting to fall in to place and 
includes the T (triage), Å (incident management), T (measures on patient) and the T 
(transportation to hospital). The follow-up phase is when the incident is over and the units 
evaluate their performance and the situation returns to normal. This phase is not elaborated in 
the FORSTÅTT check-list. The final and sixed phase is the chaos phase. The other phases 
follow a chronological order. Chaos phase violates chronology and can occur at any time 
during a reaction. This phase can vary from person to person. Anyone can end up in this 
phase. For those with little experience and training it can occur on a minor traffic accident, 
while for others this may happen by major disasters. Characteristics are stress, tunnel vision 
and lack of overview of the situation. 
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F = preparation (Forbredelse) Being prepared for all types of events. This includes 
existing professional knowledge and experience, training and education, as well as 
establishing standard operational procedures. Securing equipment and tools, as well as 
bringing the necessary equipment and resources to the area of deployment. Preparing for all 
kinds of weather and environment and thinking through the security. Establishing contact with 
other emergency units. 
O = information, deployment and organization / management (opplysning, oppmarsj og 
organisering/ledelse). Gather and provide information, request sufficient resources and 
confirm that the resources are on the way. Follow deployment plan; placement of vehicles 
appropriately to ensure escape route. Create incident command post (ICP) and communication 
with dispatch centers.  
R = risk assessment, reconnaissance and resources (risikovurdering, rekognosering og 
ressurser). Assess the risk and safety, obtaining an overview and adjust the resources 
according to the situation. Do the reconnaissance together with the other leaders in CP. Notify 
Red Cross, NSB, the landowners, etc. 
S = securing and situation report (sikring og situasjonsrapport). Ensuring the safety of 
personnel and plan escape routes. Giving and receiving situation report from the dispatch 
centers and making adjustments to the resources as needed. Be predictive and not reactive and 
event-driven. Provide and obtain good, accurate and time-critical information. 
T = triage (prioritizing) (triage og prioritering). Prioritizing of patients so that everyone 
gets the right treatment at the right time. First priority is life, then property and the 
environment. 
Å = the incident site management (Åstedshåndtering). Continue with the operative work 
at the scene, this includes good overview of the situation, clear roles and responsibilities, 
handling of media and Communication, Coordination and Control.  
T = measures on patient (tiltak på pasient). Life-saving measures is the main priority for 
all agencies, after triage, provide physical and psychological first aid to all involved. 
T = transportation to hospital (transport til sykehus). Starting the transport of critical 
patients to the hospital as early as possible. Give a report to the medical dispatch center about 
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the patients. Establish cooperation between patient assembly area and the evacuation control 
point. 
The FORSTÅTT check-list with its eight categories organized into six phases describes 
the incident management process from the beginning and to the end. The follow-up phase is 
not further described with any of the FORSTÅTT elements and the chaos phase does not 
follow any sequential order and is unpredictable. All of these phases and elements might help 
the operational leaders in ICP to organize the incident site in a collaborative manner.  
The FORSTÅTT check-list lists some common elements for all three emergency units. As 
mentioned earlier this cheek list is developed as a tool to create a shared language and hope to 
increase collaboration between the different units. It might be interesting to look closer at 
collaboration between two or more agencies and the factors that can influence the 
collaboration. The next section of this paper will therefore take a closer look at collaboration 
and influencing factors, before a model of interdisciplinary collaboration is introduced. 
Collaboration 
There is an international move towards assuming integrated emergency management 
(IEM). This integration of the three units in the incident management will to a greater extent 
result in command responsibilities being performed in a context dominated by multi-agency 
and multi-jurisdictional response (Paton, Johnston, & Houghton, 1998). As mentioned earlier 
this is also the case in Norway. Aspects that can be affected by the multi-agency collaboration 
might be information management, decision making, team work and incident management 
processes. Most of these elements are essentially determined by the quality of the 
communication between the emergency units and the ability to obtain shared situation 
awareness. This makes communication and situation awareness interesting topics within the 
collaboration literature that are worth a closer look.  
Communication and information flow. Disasters represent occasions where the 
boundaries between the various emergency services are blurred (Kapucu, 2006) and can 
involve a complex network of interdependent agencies (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). It is 
important that information flows in a coordinated manner through a multi-organizational and 
multi-level network. This means, that for the organizations to function, they are dependent on 
not only their internal interactions, but also on the collaboration with other agencies (Bharosa, 
Lee, & Janssen, 2010). According to Pužar, Andersson, Plagemann, and Roudier (2005) there 
are two essential requirements for effective collaboration; the motivation to collaborate and 
14 
 
the capability to communicate and share information efficiently. A number of studies indicate 
that low information sharing and coordination throughout inter-agency disaster response 
shows a negative influence on collective decision-making and collaboration (Dawes, 
Cresswell, & Cahan, 2004; Helsloot, 2005; Junglas & Ives, 2007; Pan, Pan, & Devadoss, 
2005). Well-organized and secure communication and information exchange between the 
emergency units are crucial to limit the damage, save lives and ensure personnel safety within 
large-scale incidents and disasters (Lereim et al., 2012).  Collaboration is important to insure 
communication and information flow between the units. For an efficient information flow and 
communication between the operational leaders in ICP they need to create a shared picture of 
the situation (Harrald & Jefferson, 2007). Situational awareness in the context of emergency 
response is explained in the next section. 
Situation awareness. For an effective disaster and emergency response during an event, it 
is important that the rescue workers have proficient communication skills and a high levels of 
situational awareness (Dilmaghani, Manoj, & Rao, 2007; Harrald & Jefferson, 2007). 
Situation awareness has been defined as “the perception of the elements in the environment 
within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of 
their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1995, p. 36). According to Waugh and Streib (2006) 
the poor communication and lack of situation awareness was among the main problems with 
the command when handling the disaster after Hurricane Katrina. Oomes (2004) argues that 
there also is a need for organizational awareness to obtain an efficient collaboration and 
communication at incidents that involves multiple emergency services. Organization 
awareness is an understanding of the multiple agencies that make up the organization and how 
they relate to each other. When individuals collaborate they rely on situation awareness in all 
stages of the information process to help them combine their unique knowledge and skills to reach 
their goals (Sonnenwald, 2004).  
As collaboration and certain influencing factors have been introduced it is about time to 
clarify the terminology in this paper by first looking at the most frequently used terms for 
explaining collaboration between two or more different agencies or disciplines. Followed by 
an presentation of a model for interdisciplinary collaboration. This model is based on theory 
rather than practice and attempts to list all the necessary elements in collaboration between 
agencies.  
Interdisciplinary collaboration. Interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary collaboration are 
terms that have been extensively compared and contrasted (Besselaar & Heimeriks, 2001; 
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Jessup, 2007; Lawrence & Despres, 2004). Terms that have been used to name or describe 
collaboration between more than one field are interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, inter-
professional, and team-focused collaboration (Besselaar & Heimeriks, 2001; Kenny, 2002; 
Salipante, 2002; Stout, 1997). All of these terms are defined in several ways. There also 
seems to be a lack of consensus about the difference between inter- and multidisciplinary 
collaboration (Lawrence & Despres, 2004). According to Besselaar and Heimeriks (2001) 
Multidisciplinary is when several disciplines are working side by side, but not integrated. 
Each discipline keeps its methodologies and assumptions without change or development 
from other disciplines within the multidisciplinary relationship. An interdisciplinary field is a 
field that crosses traditional boundaries between disciplines or schools of thought. An 
interdisciplinary approach creates its own theoretical, conceptual and methodological identity. 
As the emergency units are organized as three different departments with individual 
procedures, working methodology and concepts, they would seem to be multidisciplinary 
rather than interdisciplinary. However, when they work together in ICP they create mutual 
strategies, they share information and are dependent on each other, which appears more like 
interdisciplinary collaboration.  
Interdisciplinary collaboration is therefore an unresolved area, but tries to explain the 
collaboration between agencies with different professional backgrounds. Based on that 
observation, this paper will draw mostly on interdisciplinary literature, and chooses to 
understand interdisciplinary collaboration as two or more disciplines working together toward 
a common goal. One way to understand collaboration between different disciplines is through 
Laura Bronstein`s model of interdisciplinary collaboration. 
A Model for Interdisciplinary Collaboration 
Bronstein´s (2003) model of interdisciplinary collaboration, “A Model for 
Interdisciplinary Collaboration” is based on the work of American social workers. But by 
drawing from several theoretical frameworks (through an integration of a multidisciplinary 
theory of collaboration, services integration, role theory, and ecological systems theory 
(Bronstein, 2003)), the intention of this model is to provide a generic model for social 
workers: “Although differences exist among disciplines, this model is meant to be a generic 
depiction of the components of optimum collaboration between social workers and other 
professionals” (Bronstein, 2003, p. 299). This model might therefore also explain the 
elements necessary for interdisciplinary collaboration within the emergency response field. 
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Responding to an extreme event requires collaboration by several organizations with different 
cultures and structures. The work situations of social workers are in many ways different from 
that of emergency response workers. However, the emergency response personnel also needs 
to collaborate across disciplines, and share a common goal of saving lives, this model might 
therefore be suitable to explain the collaboration between emergency units as well. 
Model 2 
 Interdisciplinary collaboration model 
 
(Bronstein, 2003) 
Bronsteins model is one of few models that are designed for interdisciplinary collaboration 
(Bronstein, 2002). Her work points to five essential elements for successful collaboration, 
these are; interdependence, new created professional activities, flexibility, collective 
ownership of goals and reflection on the process. Each of these elements will be described in 
more detail: 
Interdependence: occurs when different professions rely on interaction between 
disciplines and are dependent on the others to accomplish their own goals and tasks. They 
must have a clear, mutual understanding of roles and use them correctly.  Interdependence 
usually consists of formal and informal gatherings, oral and written communication, and 
respect for all employees, professional opinions and suggestions.  
Newly created professional activities: is when collaborative acts, programs, and 
structures can achieve more than if the professionals acted independently. These activities 
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maximize the expertise of each collaborator. One example is when the fire department 
assumes responsibility as the Operations Commander until the police arrives at the site.  
Flexibility: is the intentional occurrence of role-blurring. Typical characteristics of 
flexible behavior are to compromise when disagreements occur and the modification of roles 
as a creative solution to a situation. According to Mendonça, Jefferson and Harrald (2007) 
emergency personnel may take on new or expanded roles, adjust the organizational structures, 
and adapt existing technological tools to unexpected needs to meet response goals.  
Collective ownership of goals: refers to common responsibility in the whole process of 
reaching goals, including design, definition, development, and achievement of goals. Each 
professional must take responsibility for their own part in success and failure and support 
constructive disagreement and discussion within the team. This also includes common goals, 
strategies, making decisions together, and having a well-defined and realistic goal. In complex 
and turbulent environments, organizations frequently develop formal or informal relationships 
in order to work together to pursue shared goals, address common concerns, and/or attain 
mutually beneficial ends (Kapucu, 2005).  
Reflection on process: includes collaborators thinking and talking with each other 
about their working relationship and process, and including feedback to each other in their 
evaluation process to strengthen collaborative relationships and effectiveness. It is also 
important to evaluate after smaller incidents as well as larger scale incidents 
(Politidirektoratet, 2011). Bronstein (2003) also describes four influencing factors on 
interdisciplinary collaboration. These are factors that put the collaboration model in context 
and are individual, group and external factors like society and the organization. The 










Model 3  
Influencing factors on interdisciplinary collaboration
 
(Bronstein, 2003) 
Professional role: A strong sense of professional role include a commitment to the 
agency settings, respect for professional colleagues and a perspective that is similar or 
complementary to the perspectives of colleagues. Factors that influence the professional role 
are status, hierarchy, roles, values and practice. Differences among professions are intensified 
by the value each professional places on autonomy and the ability to be self-directed.  
Structural characteristics: This includes a manageable caseload, an agency culture 
that supports interdisciplinary collaboration, financial support, administrative support, 
professional autonomy, and time and space to collaborate.  
Personal Characteristics: In this setting this includes how collaborators view each 
other outside the professional role the colleague holds. Influences on collaboration might be; 
trust, respect, understanding or similar perspectives and informal communication among 
colleagues.  
History of collaboration: This is previous experience from interdisciplinary teams. If 
professionals have a history of working in interdisciplinary teams, their experience with this 
kind of work may color future collaboration. By including the influencing factors the 
collaboration process is put in a contest based on personal trades, experience and external 
factors like interpersonal and organizational factors. These factors can hinder or promote 
collaboration between the various agencies and individuals.  This might be important as the 
three operational leaders in ICS are associated with different organizations, have different 
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professional backgrounds and in general have different preconditions (Bharosa et al., 2010). 
The combination of collaboration elements and influencing factors might present a holistic 
view of interdisciplinary collaboration. 
The FORSTÅTT check-list and interdisciplinary collaboration model are two 
frameworks that explain the collaboration process in two different perspectives. As the 
FORSTÅTT check-list are practical and sequential and the interdisciplinary collaboration 
model with concrete elements of the collaboration and the influencing factors. Although 
research on collaborative public management and cross-sector collaboration is flourishing, the 
research within the field of emergency response is still under developed (Simo & Bies, 2007). 
Based on that an interdisciplinary model based a different domain and a domain specific 
framework was presented to gain both perspectives.  
Present Study 
This study seeks to investigate if a generic model or a domain-specific model is the more 
appropriate for describing interaction between police, fire and health managers at a major 
incident. The generic model “an interdisciplinary collaboration model” describes the essential 
elements of collaboration between two or more disciplines. The domain-specific procedure 
system “FORSTÅTT” focuses on the necessary steps to ensure an effective incident 
management by all three leaders in the incident command post (ICP). The interviews were 
structured using the SWOT framework, which aims to identify positive and negative aspects 
of the presents and the future. Semi-structured interviews were conducted to gather 
information about the collaboration between emergency response leaders from the police, 
fire-department and ambulance services. The interview questions were open ended, giving the 
informants the opportunity to speak freely about the subject. The interviews were coded into 
the categories of the two frameworks, and then analyzed through the number of statements 
that can be encoded in the model and the procedures (see methods for further description). 
The purpose of this study is to provide empirical support for how well the model or the 
procedures can be used to explain collaboration between emergency response units in 
Norway. The research question of this paper is: 
How well can FORSTÅTT check-list  and the interdisciplinary collaboration model 
account for the collaboration between emergency response leaders in the central eastern 
area of Norway?  
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The research question will be answered by testing four possible alternatives; the 
FORSTÅTT check-list, the interdisciplinary collaboration model, a combination of the two or 
a modified version of the combination of the model and the procedures including potential 
residual categories.  
Standard operational procedures are widely used in emergency response (Flin, Slaven, & 
Stewart, 1996), and as mentioned earlier it is often recommended to make shared operational 
procedures (McConnell & Drennan, 2006). The standard operational procedures in the 
emergency response units in Norway are still separate, but the FORSTÅTT check-list that 
have been presented by the Norwegian Air Ambulance is an attempt to create a set of shared 
procedures. According to Vigerust et al. (2009) these procedures seeks to improve the 
collaboration and create a common language between the three emergency units. The 
following hypothesis will therefore test if that is the case: 
Hypothesis 1: There will be no significant difference between the number of 
statements captured by the FORSTÅTT check-list and the total number of statements 
about collaboration. 
The interdisciplinary collaboration model presented by Laura Bronstein (2003) explains the 
necessary elements for en effective collaboration between personnel from different 
professions. She argues that her model is generic (Bronstein, 2002), and that even though 
differences among collaboration relationships exists, the elements that are important for 
collaboration are the same regardless of the field. If the interdisciplinary collaboration model 
is generic, the model should be able to explain all the statements concerning collaboration. 
The following hypothesis will test this claim: 
Hypothesis 2: There will be no significant difference between the number of 
statements captured by the interdisciplinary collaboration model and the total number of 
statements about collaboration.  
The FORSTÅTT check-list system is a framework that provides the three units have a 
common language and understanding of the steps necessary to ensure a safe, efficient and 
holistic solution of the situation. The interdisciplinary collaboration model looks at the 
characteristics of a well working collaboration situation. Therefore the collaboration between 
the three units may best be describes by a combination of the operational procedures 
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investigated by FORSTÅTT and the interdisciplinary collaboration between the people 
working within the all three units, by combining the models.  
Hypothesis 3: There will be no significant difference between the number of staments 
captured by the FORSTÅTT check-list and the Interdisciplinary collaboration model 
combined and the total number of statements about collaboration 
Since the FORSTÅTT check-list and the Interdisciplinary collaboration model seeks to cover 
all statements about collaboration the residuals should only comprise of irrelevant information 
when investigating collaboration between the three emergency units. 




 This paper is written as part of the European project Bridge as a result of a partnership 
between the Department of Psychology (UiO), Research Group for Work and Organizational 
psychology and SINTEF. The project aims to increase safety and security for the population 
in Europe through better technical and organizational solutions, especially emergency services 
coordination and management of large-scale emergency events such as terrorist attacks, 
natural disasters and industrial accidents. The Bridge project 
(http://www.sintef.no/home/Press-Room/Research-News/Better-prepared-for-major-
disasters/) is an collaboration between universities, research groups, technological firms and 
domain experts. The project started in April 2011, and will continue until 2014. 
 
Understanding the Domain 
The domain has been approached by means of document analysis, participation in a 
workshop organized by SINTEF (Bridge) and observation to understand the domain. Through 
this process, the relevant topics became clear and the basis for the choice of informants was 
formed through the document analysis, the workshop and the observations. 
Document analysis was conducted by looking into strategic documents as well as laws 
and regulations. The documents selected focused on current practice, including operational 
manuals like Police emergency response system, Part I: Guidelines for police emergency 
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(PBS I) (Politidirektoratet, 2011), Medical operational manual (MOM) (Flingtorp, Næss, & 
Kolberg, 2007) and The rescue service handbook (2008). These documents provided a 
strategic perspective of how operational emergency management is organized. The police act, 
the fire safety act and regulations relating to medical emergency, as well as the NOU JD 2001: 
31 about the organization of rescue operations and emergency response resources. The 
document analysis was primarily a way to gather knowledge about the organizations, goals 
and tasks involved in emergency respond. 
A workshop with emergency unit personnel was held by SINTEF on behalf of Bridge 
to gather information about the on scene work. In the workshop the participants were asked to 
map out among other things the important roles within the units, important elements to obtain 
situation awareness and communication patterns. The operational leaders within the incident 
command post appeared to be an important group to study when focusing on the on scene 
emergency response work based on the information form the workshop. 
Observations of training exercises and field observations were also conducted to 
increase our understanding of practice that was described in formal documentation and the 
workshop. A two part exercise in North Trøndelag about a bus rollover was observed. A table 
top exercise of operational command in Steinkjer and an emergency training exercise in 
Levanger. Information has also been gathered through field observations by following an 
operational leader health at work. All observations were documented by field notes and some 
audio recordings. The observations gave a better understanding of the co-work between the 
three emergency units in the command post (CP). 
Informants 
The informants were all operational leaders with experience from the incident command 
post (ICP). The incident command post (ICP) consists of the incident leader from the police, 
operative leader health and operational leader of fire. All the informants are from the central 
eastern part of Norway. Consequently the targeted group for this study was taken from a small 
population. Data was gathered through 17 interviews with emergency response personnel with 
Operational Commander experience; six fire fighters, six police officers and five paramedics. 
All the informants have recently been or are currently working as Operational Commanders 
within Oslo or the surrounding areas (Oslo (n=7), and central eastern areas (n=10)). All 
informants were either permanent Operational Commander or assigned “ad hoc” leaders at 
certain events. They had between fifteen and thirty-five years (M= 22.6) of general 
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experience, and between two and thirty-three years (M=11.5) of experience as Operational 
Commander. Their average age was forty-eight years and all informants were male.   
The interviews were conducted at the workplace of all the informants before, after or 
during a quiet part of the shift, except one who was interviewed in a conference room at 
SINTEF in one of his days off. The interviews lasted on average 30 minutes 27 seconds (R= 
16 min 19 s - 46 min 38 s, SD= 7 minutes 8 seconds).  
Mixed Model Design 
Mixed model design is a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. There are two 
major types of mixed methods research mixed-model designs and mixed-method designs 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). According to Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) mixed models 
is the most popular way of mixing methods within the behavior and social science research. 
One can construct mixed-model designs by mixing qualitative and quantitative methods 
within and across the three stages of the research process: initial clarification of the research 
objective, when collecting the data, or when analyzing the data (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004). It was decided to do this by constructing interview questions based on the SWOT 
framework (Chermack & Kasshanna, 2007) and coding the answers into categories within two 
frameworks; FORSTÅTT and The Interdisciplinary Collaboration Model where it was 
analyzed statistically in SPSS.   
 Qualitative data was gathered with the help of semi-structured interviews according to 
the SWOT framework. According to Kvale (1997), it is a strength to use interviews as data 
collection method because one gets variation in the data in terms of the informants’ 
perceptions of a subject, and thus one can get a picture of a diverse and controversial human 
world. As the starting point for this thesis was to obtain operational managers experiences and 
perspectives on how interaction takes place, it was appropriate to have a conversation with 
them, and the interview was therefore a natural choice as the basis for data collection. SWOT 
seeks to find Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (Helms & Nixon, 2010). This 
method is used to help the subject reflect about current practices and future situation (Hoff et 
al., 2009). SWOT does not cue the participants to any particular type of answers, but rather 
encourages them to reflect on the positive and negative sides of a given situation. Thereby, it 
encourages reflection on the strengths and weaknesses regarding their present collaboration 
situation and decision making, and future opportunities and threats regarding the same topics. 
SWOT is usually used as a strategic mapping tool, but there have been numerous claims to the 
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origin, the epistemological status of the tool and a lack of theoretical foundation (Helms & 
Nixon, 2010). The tool has been used in a multitude of fields (Rizzo & Kim, 2005). SWOT is 
a technique that can be applied to individuals, groups, teams, organizations, or even plans 
(Chermack & Kasshanna, 2007). 
 Quantitative analysis is done by transcribing the qualitative data and unitizing the 
contents into meaningful statements, each meaningful statement is then transferred into SPSS 
and given a value in the chosen framework. By giving the statements values in one or several 
frameworks one can perform statistical analysis within the material. Quantitative methods 
have been argued to be more appropriate for hypothesis testing than qualitative methods 
(Lund, 2012). By using a mixed model approach this way one can maps the participants’ 
responses to open-ended questions into specific categories in SPSS.  
Process  
Preparation. Preparing and executing the interviews was based on the PEACE model 
consisting of five-stages. The PEACE model was produced with the aim to improve the 
quality of interviews of suspects, and is summarized by the mnemonic PEACE; Planning and 
preparation, Engage and explain, Account, Closure and Evaluate (Milne & Bull, 1999). The 
PEACE model was chosen to ensure the quality and consistency of the interview process for 
the informants and the interviewer.  
The interview. Each informant was asked two sets of questions; one about collaboration 
and one about decisions making. The two sets of questions were asked in a randomized order, 
so that half of the informants were asked about collaboration first and the other half were 
asked about decision making first. This paper will only use the data gathered based on the 
questions about collaboration:  
What strengths do you see in the way you collaborate in CP? 
What are the weaknesses you see the way you collaborate in CP? 
What can be the long term challenges in the collaboration in CP? 
What opportunities do you see that could help the collaboration in CP be more 
efficient in the future? 
The questions encouraged the informants to talk about their own experience and perspective, 
but since they were asked to talk about themselves in a group situation it was expected that 
they would talk about their colleges as well.  
The method was chosen to give the informants an opportunity to talk freely with 
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minimal guiding from the interview guide. Additional information was acquired by asking the 
informants follow up questions, such as: “Are there other strengths related to…?”, “Could you 
illustrate this by giving an example?”, and “Could you specify what you mean by…?”. If the 
participants mentioned something of interest in the former interview, they were asked to 
repeat the information. The interview was always conducted with one interviewer and one 
observer. There should be more than one person present at the interview to minimize bias and 
provide objectivity and measurable reliability (Kvale, 1996).  
Transcription. All the interviews were taped, and afterwards the recordings were 
transcribed according to a transcription procedure. This procedure states that the recording 
should be transcribed verbatim, only leaving out technical discussions and affirmative 
statements by the interviewer (e.g. yes, right and mhm). All the transcriptions are written in 
the transcribers’ sociolect. According to Flick (1998) exaggerated accuracy in transcription 
procedures are necessary only when relevant to the content of the interview and will in many 
cases be an unnecessary use of time. Examples of the things that were left out are a discussion 
about a coffeepot, the noise in the next door room and informants answering their cellphone 
or radio since they were at work.  
Unitizing. A content analysis was conducted on all the transcribed interviews, 
resulting in quantifiable units of text. This process is called unitizing, and resulted in two 
types of statements; meaningful statements and example statements.  A statement was defined 
as the smallest meaningful unit that represents a new topic of interest. A statement can contain 
a part of a sentence, a whole sentence or several sentences, according to this definition (Hoff 
et al., 2009). One statement should be small enough to contain only one topic (Weber, 1990). 
Example statements were statements that exemplified or elaborated a topic, without adding 
any new meaning. These units may also include a further explanation of a meaningful 
statement. Example units did not add anything unique to an already established meaningful 
statement. These units are connected to meaningful statements to give them more clarity, 
functioning as context units. Parts of sentences were also sometimes included to provide 
context to meaningful statements. Krippendorf (2004) points out that as long as the units are 
different and the same meaning is not replicated, context units can be used to describe one or 
several units.  The unitizing was done according to beforehand agreed upon procedure 
developed based on literature (Krippendorff, 2004; Neuendorf, 2002; Weber, 1990). The 
unitizing procedures can be found in the Appendix E. Finally the statements were imported to 
SPSS in chronological order to preserve the context of the interview (Krippendorff, 2004). 
26 
 
Inter-judge reliability of unitizing. To increase the reproducibility of the unitizing 
process an inter-judge reliability was conducted. As Neuendorf (2002, p. 141) stated, “given 
that a goal of content analysis is to identify and record relatively objective (or at least 
intersubjective) characteristics of messages, reliability is paramount. Without the 
establishment of reliability, content analysis measures are useless”.  One interview was 
transcribed unitized by all three students early in the process. The three interviews were then 
compared using an inter-judgment agreeability measure based on the percentage of agreement 
on presence (P.A.P.). This test was based on Zarghooni’s (2011) adaption of Boyatzis’ (1998)  
percentage of agreement of presence (P.A.P.), to account for inter-judge reliability of 
unitizing between two unitizers. However, it was modified in order to account for the inter-
judge reliability between three unitizers. This was done by calculating the inter-judge 
reliability between student A and B, student A and C and student B and C, and then adding 
the three results together and calculating the mean value. After three repetitions of this 
process, the resulting inter-judge reliability of unitizing stabilized at 68 %. For further 
description of inter-judge reliability for unitizing, see Zarghooni (2011).   
Coding. All the unitized statements from the transcribed interviews were then transferred 
into SPSS statistics for coding. All the statements were coded in both the FORSTÅTT check-
list and the interdisciplinary collaboration model.  
The FORSTÅTT check-list were operationalized into eight categories based on Vigerust, 
Andersen and Vollebæk‘s (2009) article. Each statement was given a code in SPSS from one 
to eight and then the residuals were given number nine. Each statement could only be coded 
in one of the eight categories or as a residual. The categories were Preparation (1), 
Information, Deployment, Organization/leadership (2), Risk Assessment, Reconnaissance, 
Resources (3), Securing, Situation Report (4), Triage (prioritizing) (5), Incident Management 
(6), Measures on Patient (7), Transportation to Hospital (8) and residuals (9). 
The interdisciplinary collaboration model was operationalized based on Laura Bronstein‘s 
article called A Model for Interdisciplinary Collaboration (2003). The model was split into 
two; one collaboration part and one influencing factors part. This was done because the 
influencing factors might have been lost if all elements were included in one model, as they 
are not mutually exclusive. The collaboration model included six categories which were all 
given a number from one to six; interdependence (1), new activities as a result of the 
collaboration (2), flexibility (3), joint ownership of goals (4) and reflection on the process (5). 
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The statements that did not fit into any of the categories were placed in residuals (6). Each 
statement could only be placed in one of the categories or in residual. The influencing factors 
consisted of Professional role (1), Structural characteristics (2), Personal characteristics (3) or 
History of collaboration (4) and if the statement did not fit in any of these categories they 
were coded as residuals.  
Statistical analysis. The statistical analysis included descriptive analysis and 
differential analysis made in SPSS. The descriptive analysis was constructed through cross 
tables, the explore function and frequency tables. The differential analysis was conducted 
through paired t-tests between the various averages. The normal distribution was calculated 
before conducting the t-tests. A bonferroni correction was considered as a way of adjustments 
for multiple tests, but it is deemed unnecessary by Perneger (1998) and was therefore not used 
in this study. Perneger argues that by using a bonferroni correction there is, among other 
problems, an increased possibility of making a type II error. The effect size was calculated 
according to Cohen`s d (Cohen, 1988).  
Thematic analysis. A content analysis was conducted on the residual statements that were 
not included in ether of the models. A content analysis is according to Krippendorff “a 
research technique for making reliable and valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their 
use” (2004, p. 18). Statements addressing similar topics were copied in to a separate 
document and given an overall category title. All the statements were then copied in to a new 
SPSS document in the new categories. 
Ethical considerations. Each of the informants received an information-letter in advance 
of the interview and a consent form based on the information-letter at the time the interview 
was carried out. According to Flick, Kvale, Angrosino, Barbour, Banks, Gibbs and Rapley 
(2007), it is important to create a safe framework for the interview so that the subject can feel 
free to talk about topics that will later be used in a public setting. Examples of the things that 
were explained in the information letter and consent form were anonymity, storing of the data 
and further use of the information. All the informants were anonymized when the interviews 
were transcribed. The anonymizing included the name and workplace of the informant, as 
well as all people mentioned in the interview. The data will only be used by members of the 
Bridge project and will be deleted after the completion of the Bridge project in 2014. The 
interviews were conducted in Norwegian, but sections of the information were later translated 
into English. This was done to make the informants more comfortable and not add any stress 
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to the situation by asking them to answer in another language.  A copy of the full sets of 
questions along with the information-letter and consent form can be found in Appendix A-C.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics  
A total of 2277 statements were identified in the 17 interviews. There was 628 statements 
which were identified as examples and therefor excluded from the dataset, leaving 1649 
statements (M =97, SD=32.22) as the basis for further analysis.  
The FORSTÅTT check-list accounted for 1072 of the 1649 statements (M =63.06 and SD 
=23.73). A total of 582 statements were not accounted for by the FORSTÅTT check-list (M 
=33.94, SD =10.50). These statements were distributed across all categories, but were 
somewhat unevenly distributed (Range=5-405 and SD=136.40). The distribution of the 
statements in FORSTÅTT can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1. 
FORSTÅTT 
Category Count Mean SD 
F preparation 405 23.82 10.50 
O information, deployment and organization / management 139 8.18 5.29 
R risk assessment, reconnaissance and resources 230 13.53 7.67 
S securing and situation report 108 6.35 4.66 
T triage (prioritizing) 19 1.12 2.23 
Å the incident management 159 9.35 7.50 
T measures on patient 6 0.35 0.86 









Total 1649 97.06 32.24 
 
The interdisciplinary collaboration model accounted for a total of 1364 statements out of 
1649 (M=80.24 and SD=25.72). The interdisciplinary collaboration model consists of the 
collaboration elements and the influencing factors. A total of 285 statements (M =16.76 and 
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SD=11.12) were not accounted for by the interdisciplinary collaboration model. For the 
distribution between the categories see table 2. 
Table 2.  
Interdisciplinary collaboration 
 Category Count Mean SD 








 Newly created professional 88 5.18 5.47 
 Flexibility 61 3.59 3.18 
 Collective ownership of goals 334 19.65 10.87 
 Reflection on process 123 7.24 5.49 
     
 Residual 494 28.94 13.73 
 Total 1649 97.06 32.24 
Influencing factors     
Professional role 235 13.82 10.06 
 Structural characteristics 374 22.00 9.97 
 Personal Characteristics 214 12.59 6.43 
 History of collaboration 78 4.59 3.08 
     
 Residual 748 44.00 22.77 
 Total 1649 97.06 32.24 
 
Table 3 explains the relationship between the collaboration elements and the influencing 










































16 34 7 3 28 88 




78 41 38 10 167 334 
Reflection on 
process 
7 24 14 16 62 123 
Residual 25 153 22 6 288 494 
Total 235 374 214 78 748 1649 
 
By combining the results from both parts of the interdisciplinary collaboration model 
and the FORSTÅTT check-list, 1516 of the statements were covered. The number of shared 











Figure 1.  
Overlap between the two frameworks 
 
   
 
    
Table 4.  
 Cross-table between the statements captured by the FORSTÅTT check-list and the 
interdisciplinary collaboration model 
FORSTÅTT 
Interdisciplinary collaboration F O R S T Å T T Residual Total 
Interdependence 136 64 67 39 1 66 0 2 174 549 
New professional activity’s 27 7 22 3 1 6 2 1 19 88 
Flexibility 6 3 8 0 2 22 1 0 19 61 
Collective ownership of goals 44 30 95 31 14 34 2 1 83 334 
Reflection on process 48 3 4 4 1 5 1 0 57 123 
Influencing factors 53 21 19 13 0 8 0 1 91 206 
Residual 91 12 15 18 0 18 0 0 134 288 





Hypothesis 1 predicts that the FORSTÅTT check-list explains all the statements the 
informants gave about collaboration between the operational commanders at the incident area. 
A paired sample t-test was conducted and showed a significant difference between the number 
of statements in FORSTÅTT given by each informant (M =63.06, SD =23.73) and the total 
number of statements for each person (M=97, SD=32.22), t (16) = 29.982, p<0.001. d= 0,98, 
r(15) = .97, p < .01. The first null hypothesis is therefore rejected. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the interdisciplinary collaboration model explains all the 
statements the informant gave about collaboration between the operational commanders at the 
incident area. A paired sample t-test showed a significant difference between the number of 
the interdisciplinary collaboration statements each informant gave (M=80.24 and SD=25.72) 
and the total number of statements for each person (M =97, SD=32.22), t (16) = 18.556, 
p<0.001. d= 0,96, r(15) = .95, p < .01. The second null hypothesis is therefore rejected. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the FORSTÅTT check-list and the interdisciplinary 
collaboration model together explain all the statements about collaboration that were given by 
the operational commanders. A paired sample t-test showed a significant difference between 
the number of the interdisciplinary collaboration statements each informant gave (M=80.24 
and SD=25.72) and the total number of statements for each person (M=97, SD=32.22), t (16) 
= 12.024, p<0.0001. d= 0,91, r(15) = .99, p < .01. The third null hypothesis is therefore 
rejected. 
Hypothesis 4 intended to investigate whether the residual after combining the 
FORSTÅTT check-list and the interdisciplinary collaboration model were relevant for 
collaboration. The hypothesis predicted that these statements had no relevance for the 
collaboration between the three emergency units. To investigate this assumption a content 
analysis was conducted on the statements not accounted for. A content analysis of the 136 
residual statements was performed, and the content analysis revealed 7 categories that 
contained information relevant to collaboration between the three emergency units. The 
content analysis showed that only 4.4 % of the statements in the residuals from both models 
were irrelevant to the topic. The categories within the residuals are shown in table 4. The 





Categories within the residuals  
 Residual categories  Frequency  
   n % 
External conditions Change and expectations from society  46 34% 
 Technological tools  52 38.5% 
 National standards  7 5.2% 
Group conditions Leader exercise  2 1.5% 
 Different preconditions  9 6.7% 
Individual conditions Commitment and experience  13 9.6% 
 Not relevant  6 4.4% 
 Total  135 100% 
 
As shown in table 4 external conditions like society, technological tools and hindsight 
were among the most frequent statements within the residual categories. The group conditions 
were different preconditions and leader exercise. Different preconditions among the three 
emergency units were also a topic that was mentioned quite a few times and includes 
statements about different work conditions, education and organization between the three 
units. The leader exercise category describes the need for separate training of the incident CP 
situation. Within the individual conditions there were two categories; one covered the 
commitment to the job, the other one covering the value of experience. Not relevant were 
statements that were ambiguous or not related to the theme.  
Post Hoc Analysis  
The paired sample t-tests showed that neither of the FORSTÅTT check-list, the 
interdisciplinary collaboration test or the combination of the two frameworks captured the 
majority of the statements. Based on the fact that all four hypotheses were rejected, a post hoc 
analysis was performed. In the post hoc analysis the FORSTÅTT check-list and the 
interdisciplinary collaboration model were combined as well as adding the residual categories. 
Based on the descriptive analysis (table 5) of the new framework there are only 6 statements 






Comparison of the frameworks  
 FORSTÅTT Interdisciplinary 
collaboration 
Combined Including the 
residual-
categories 
Included 1067 1364 1516 1643 
Residual 582 285 133 6 
Total 1649 1649 1649 1649 
Discussion 
Summary of Results 
The purpose of this study was to empirically test two different models about 
interdisciplinary collaboration, and test the ability of the frameworks to describe the 
reflections about the collaboration among emergency response leaders within the ICP.  The 
models were tested against information gathered from semi-structured interviews with 17 
operational leaders from all three emergency units. The interviews generated a lot of 
information about collaboration and a total of 1649 statements were identified and coded in 
the two models. 
The descriptive statistics show that the FORSTÅTT check-list accounted for 1072 out of 
the 1649 statements, while the interdisciplinary collaboration model accounted for 1364 of the 
1649 statements. When the FORSTÅTT check-list and the interdisciplinary model are 
merged, the two frameworks account for 1516 out of the 1649 statements. The merged 
framework explains more of the data together then they can individually. However, as shown 
in figure 1, the majority of these statements (915) were coded in both the FORSTÅTT model 
and the interdisciplinary collaboration model. The coverage of the data does only increase 
with 9% by adding the FORSTÅTT check-list to the interdisciplinary collaboration model. 
This suggests that the two models to some degree explain the same aspects in the data.  
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Hypothesis 1 was applied to test whether a domain specific model, based on Vigerust, 
Andersen & Vollebæks common operational procedures (2009) were able to account for the 
answers given by operational leaders from the three emergency units to an open ended 
questions about collaboration. Even though that the check-list is based on the existing 
operational procedures from all three emergency units, the analysis shows that only 1067 of 
the 1649 statements from the interviews are accounted for by FORSTÅTT. The distribution of 
statements as presented in Table 1 shows that there is an uneven distribution among the 
categories. The t-test test shows that there is a significant difference between the statements 
captured in FORSTÅTT and the total number of statements. The significance level indicates 
that it is little chance that this result is caused based on coincidence. The effect size for this 
test indicates according to Cohen`s d (1988) a high effect size, which might indicate a 
substantial result. This suggests that FORSTÅTT check-list alone is unable to account for all 
the statements from the interviews. A paired sample t-test was conducted to assess the 
differences between the statements covered by the FORSTÅTT check-list and the total number of 
statements and based on this result hypothesis 1 is rejected.   
Hypothesis 2 was used to test whether a generic model, based on Bronstein´s (2003) 
interdisciplinary collaboration model, “A Model for Interdisciplinary Collaboration” is able to 
account for the answers given by operational leaders from the three emergency units to an 
open ended questions about collaboration. The model is based on existing interdisciplinary 
models and extensively cited in social worker, nurse and educational literature. The analysis 
shows that only 1364 of the 1649 statements from the interviews can be accounted for by the 
interdisciplinary collaboration model, leaving 17% of the statements unaccounted for. The t-
test result shows that there are statistically significant differences between the statements 
covered in the interdisciplinary collaboration model and the total number of statements, this 
test does also have a high effect size according to Cohen`s d. This suggests that the 
interdisciplinary collaboration model alone is unable to account for all the statements from the 
interviews. Through a paired sample t-test the interdisciplinary collaboration model and the total 
number of statements was compared, based on this result hypothesis 2 was rejected as well.   
Hypothesis 3. Although the FORSTÅTT check-list claims to be common operational 
procedures to make the collaboration easier for the three units, the models focus is in most 
parts on operational procedures for the emergency response process. The FORSTÅTT check-
list makes no claims to be a cross-professional collaboration model, but rather a common 
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procedure which promotes interaction between the three units (Vigerust et al., 2009). The idea 
is that a combination of this model and the interdisciplinary collaboration model together can 
explain all the statements about the interaction between the three different emergency 
agencies. As mentioned earlier Paton, Johnston and Houghton (1998) argues that there is an 
international tendency of more multi agency and multi-jurisdictional work within emergency 
response. Hypothesis 3 was for that reason applied to test whether a combination of the 
FORSTÅTT check-list and the interdisciplinary collaboration model together could account 
for all statements extracted from the interviews. The results show that the combined models 
account for 1516 (92 %) of the total statements. This shows that a combined model can 
account for a larger part of the statements than the models are able to individually. However, 
as presented in Figure 1, a considerable part of these statements is identified in both models. 
The FORSTÅTT check-list only accounts for 152 statements unaccounted for by the 
interdisciplinary collaboration model. However, a paired sample t-test show that there was an 
significant difference between the statements captured by the two frameworks and the total 
number of statements. The significance level indicates that it is little chance that this result is 
caused based on coincidence. The effect size for this test is high according to Cohen`s d 
(1988), which might indicate a substantial result. Based on the high correlation there may give 
an artificially high result. However, based on this result hypothesis 3 is also rejected. 
Hypothesis 4. The thematic analysis of the residual analyses of the 135 residual statements 
revealed that 4.4% of the statements were irrelevant to the topic. The statements were 
organized into seven categories which were classified into external, group and individual 
conditions (see table 5). This was done based on the different scope the categories have on the 
emergency units. The individual and group conditions might be dealt with on an agency level, 
as the external conditions are often of a political and society nature, which can be difficult to 
handle locally. Many of these categories are of great importance to collaboration and should 
have been included in frameworks claim to explain the collaboration in emergency units. 
Based on this analysis hypothesis 4 is rejected.  
The Post Hoc Analysis 
 The post hoc analysis consists of combination of the two frameworks and the new 
categories derived from the thematic analysis of the residuals. The two frameworks explain 
somewhat different aspects of the collaboration process in emergency response. The 
FORSTÅTT check-list concentrates on the common necessary action at the incident area 
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which helps the three operational leaders to speak the same language and have a common 
progress when handling the incident. The FORSTÅTT check-list captures statements about 
the specific tasks that are preformed when they work together. The interdisciplinary 
collaboration model on the other hand captures the collaborative processes between the 
operational leaders while they solve the tasks. Together the two frameworks emphasize 
different aspects of collaboration, but they still don’t capture all statements about 
collaboration. A thematic analysis of the residual from the two frameworks reviled six new 
categories that were relevant for the collaboration. The new categories were grouped in to 
external, group and individual conditions. By including these categories of the combined 
model applied the new model the perspective of society and the agency, and expand the 
individual perspective. By combining both frameworks and including the residual categories 
1643 of 1649 statements were captured. This suggests that a new model based on all of these 
elements might be appropriate for explaining collaboration between emergency response 
leaders. 
The Relevance of the Two Frameworks  
In this section, the results from testing the theoretical model and practical framework 
will be discussed and connected to relevant theory. This will be done by discussing the largest 
and smallest categories according to the number of statements they capture in the two 
frameworks. Some implications will also be presented. Based on the hypotheses that have 
been presented in this study there seems to be no significant evidence that supports these 
frameworks for explaining collaboration between the emergency units. However, the results 
presented by looking at the descriptive statistics there is quite a large amount of the statements 
that fit into at least one category in one of the models. This may speak in favor of taking a 
closer look at the relevance of these frameworks.  
FORSTÅTT Check-List 
There are four elements in the FORSTÅTT check-list that stand out; the preparation, 
triage, measures on patient and transport to hospital. The preparation category contains almost 
twice the amount of statements of the second largest category. Why is the frequency of the 
preparation category so much higher? One explanation that comes to mind is that the 
preparation takes up so much more of the time. The preparation is described as everything 
that is done from the day you are born until the alarm goes off. Another reason might be the 
large focus that many of the departments have on preparation with the Operational Leader 
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Forum (OLF)( Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap, 2012) in Oslo, designated 
fields of expertise that some of the operational leaders have been given (e.g. tunnels, trains, 
bombes and shooting in progress) and specific scenario building for every thinkable situation. 
The need for ‘preparation’ seems to be even stronger when we consider the rapid 
development of society (McConnell & Drennan, 2006). Schwartz (2004) argues that current 
trends in technology, population change, medicine, terrorism, ethnic conflicts and others, will 
produce ‘unavoidable surprises’ which to some extent we can predicted and therefor prepared 
for. Considering all the external elements in the residual categories, that were not included in 
the FORSTÅTT check-list, the preparation for these events might be the reason for the high 
frequency in this category. The three smallest categories were the triage category, the 
measures on patient category and the transport to hospital. But why were they so much 
smaller than the others? The first explanation that comes to mind is that all these three 
categories describe actions that are typical health department tasks. The main responsibility of 
all three emergency units is to save lives, but saving lives might consist of stopping the 
shooter for the police and saving people out of a burning building for the fire department. The 
transport to the hospital, treatment of patient and the triage might not be as relevant for the 
police and fire department, and even the health department when talking about their 
collaborative effort at the scene. The FORSTÅTT check-list seeks to be a set of common 
operational procedures, and should possibly not contain agency-specific tasks.  
The FORSTÅTT check-list is sequential based on the five phases of the disaster 
management. The only phase that is described as continuous is the chaos phase. Sequential 
models work well within simple systems. However, they are limited in their capability to 
explain the interconnection between multiple elements in more complex systems (Qureshi, 
2007). The operational procedures cannot foresee all the possibilities of the work context of 
every given situation. Instructions are often designed separately for a particular task in 
isolation whereas, in the actual situation, several tasks might occur at the same time.  This 
poses additional constraints on the procedure (Rasmussen, 1997). The FORSTÅTT check-list 
is based on existing written procedures. That might be an advantage for the emergency 
personnel as they already know most of the routines included in the framework. However, as 
the original procedures from the different agencies have not been tested up against this 
sample, there is no way of telling if weaknesses exist and were transferred to the FORSTÅTT 
check-list.   
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The Interdisciplinary Collaboration Model 
The interdisciplinary collaboration model captured statements within all categories, even 
though the distribution was somewhat uneven. Within the collaboration elements there was a 
much higher frequency within the interdependence and collective ownership of goals 
categories. That is, more than half the statements that were captured in the interdependence 
and collective ownership of goals categories. When comparing the operationalization of the 
interdependence categories to the other categories it includes fare more elements. Many of the 
elements included are very wide such as communication, understanding each other roles and 
respect for each other. Therefore, one can draw doubt about the wide scoop of the 
interdependence category.  The collective ownership of goal category is also wide in scoop, 
and includes among other things design and execution of plans, common goals and decision 
making. However, the collective ownership of goals category might have a high frequency 
because it is an important part of the collaboration between the emergency units 
The influencing factors in the collaboration model are only supportive factors that may 
have an impact on how collaborators interact. The model as it is presented by Laura Bronstein 
also separate the influencing factors from the collaboration model, which made it a natural 
choice to do the same. The distribution within the influencing factors were more even then the 
collaboration elements except for the history of collaboration category. This might suggest 
that the history of collaboration is less of a concern for the emergency response personnel. 
The influencing factors also contribute with elements that neither of the other 
frameworks picks up (see table 6). According to the descriptive analysis the interdisciplinary 
collaboration model covers 83% of the statements about collaboration. This might suggest 
that this model can be suitable for explaining the collaboration between emergency response 
units if the model was altered a little bit to fit this specific domain. However, the differential 
statistics suggests that the statements covered by the total number of statements are 
significantly different from the statements that are covered by the interdisciplinary 
collaboration model.  These results might be caused by the high correlation between the two 
measurements. But it can also mean that the model does not suffice for explaining the way 
emergency services personnel interact.  
Combining the two frameworks. By using a mixed-model method with interviews that 
avoids leading the participant in any specific direction, the informants had the opportunity to 
reflect around the topic of collaboration without any theoretically preconceptions. By using 
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both practical procedures and a theoretical model of collaboration this study wanted to test 
whether the two frameworks could explain all the statements about collaboration. It was not 
an attempt to measure the collaboration between the three units.  The results from the 
differential analysis show that the models could not account for all the statements in the 
interviews, but this does not mean that the models are not relevant to the topic. In fact, the 
descriptive statistics show that the 92 % of the statements are captured by this new 
framework, this might indicate that the frameworks to some extent are relevant for explaining 
collaboration between emergency units in Norway. 
A combination of the FORSTÅTT check-list and the interdisciplinary collaboration 
model generates a new framework. This new “model” allow for both a common language and 
common understanding of how the situation should be resolved and the necessary elements 
that are important for interaction.  
Together the two frameworks form a more completely picture of the collaboration 
between the emergency units. As shown in the cross-table in table 4 there are categories 
within the two frameworks that are more important for each other. By looking at the reflection 
on process in the interdisciplinary collaboration model as an example, there is an much higher 
frequency within the F and the residuals within FORSTÅTT. This might indicate that a lot of 
the reflection on process happens before the incident in the preparation phase, and possible in 
the evaluation phase as it is not included in the FORSTÅTT categories.  
The collaboration model accounts for more statement then the FORSTÅTT check-list, 
but they both capture unique parts of the material. However, there are several important topics 
that were not picked up by any of the frameworks. 
The Residual Categories 
Since the 135 statements were distributed between 8 categories there are several very 
small categories and a few larger. By eliminating the categories with less than 10 statements 
we are left with only four categories, these are; society, technological tools, hindsight and 
commitment and experience. The first implication of this study is based on the residual 
categories and concentrates on external influencing factors. Manoj and Baker (2007) 
identified three categories of collaborative and communication challenges: technological, 
sociological, and organizational. These challenges are also identified by other researchers 
(e.g. Thévenaz & Resodihardjo, 2010; Richard, 2001; Waugh and Streib, 2006; Endsley 1995; 
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Bolstad & Endsley, 2003; Graves, 2004). According to Smith (2006) it is possible to 
minimize the extent of the damage on both human lives and economy by adoption of 
technologies that focus on inter-agency collaboration. Training, information management, 
decision making, coordination, team work and incident management processes will to a great 
extent be affected by being executed in a multi-disciplinary context (Paton et al., 1998). There 
is a strong predominance of external factors that fall outside the frameworks that was tested. 
This might be based on two aspects; that the models do not adequate captures the external 
factors and that the external factors are more important for interaction between emergency 
services and their work in general than expected. Both of these reasons or a combination of 
them can indicate that it may not have been enough focus on the external factors and their 
importance for the interaction. 
The society category is the overriding category that includes expectations from 
society, the changes in society that produces new types of incidents, pressure from society and 
hindsight after the fact. If the incidents are influenced by changes in society which create 
never before encountered incidents the emergency units may be hampered in their response 
(Thévenaz & Resodihardjo, 2010). Hindsight bias can mislead a reviewer into simplifying the 
reasons of an accident without considering the real-time situation. Given that the information 
about an accident is spread over many participants, none of which may have complete 
information, hindsight bias makes it easy to arrive at a simple solution when all the facts are 
on the table (Richard, 2001). This makes hindsight an important element of the collaboration 
between the different units since the different operational leaders in ICP might have different 
parts of the puzzle. Another aspect is the expectations from society, is not always compatible 
with the economical constrains set by the government and agencies. To meet the expectations 
of society it is even more important for the agencies to collaborate, each agency offering their 
resources and expertise to the collective efforts.  
The technological tools category consists of topics like wishes for new tools, reluctance to 
use technological tools and danger of technology when working with sensitive information. 
According to Waugh and Streib (2006) collaboration tools have a major impact on the 
operations, however collaboration tools typically require firewalls and there may be 
administrators reluctant to sacrifice network security for mission needs. Examples of tools 
that informants mentioned were maps, decisions support and resource and information 
overview tools. These tools would all help the collaboration if they integrated all emergency 
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unites in to one tool. According to Smith (2006) we may not be able to prevent these incidents, 
but we can lessen the effects of these incidents by adopting collaboration technology across 
agencies. This is backs up the argument presented by Endsley (1995), that there is a need for 
suitable technological tools and techniques to support communication and collaboration. A 
number of different tools or devices can be considered for supporting collaboration. 
Management portals, global positioning system (GPS) tracking devices, geographic 
information systems, a collaborative virtual workspace with video teleconferencing, instant 
messaging, shared whiteboards, and shared documents, and a virtual command center 
visualization tool are just a few of the suggestions in the literature (Bolstad & Endsley, 2003; 
Graves, 2004).  Interaction that are mediated by technology may negatively impact the 
development and maintenance of shared situation awareness among team members if the tools 
are not tailored to the need of the users (Endsley, 2003).  
General Discussion 
The challenges for the emergency response units are getting gradually more complex. 
There is an increase in the natural disaster, technology is getting more dominating in society 
allowing for new forms of technological disasters, foreign and domestic extremist groups are 
posing a larger threat and our shipping and oil industry poses complicated challenges for the 
emergency units (Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap, 2011).  The complexity of 
today’s emergency situations might consist of several incident areas, contradicting 
information and never before encountered situation. To be able to withstand such situations it 
may be imperative to collaborate across agencies and jurisdiction (Direktoratet for 
samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap, 2012; Lereim et al., 2012; Sønderland et al., 2012).  
Although the results from the analysis show that each of the frameworks alone were 
unable to account for the majority of the statements in this study, the two frameworks when 
combined accounted for 92% of the statements about collaboration. This suggests that these 
frameworks are somewhat relevant for collaboration between the emergency response units. 
Based on the descriptive results it is possible to draw assumptions about the importance of 
elements like shared operational procedures and a focus on interdisciplinary collaboration. 
 The demand for rapid response, the time pressure, the vital decisions that needs to be 
made based on limited information and the large specter of agencies involved during and after 
incidents are all vital elements of the response (Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og 
beredskap, 2012; Sønderland et al., 2012). Finding the best way to approach these tasks is 
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valuable as improved performance in emergency management might save lives and prevent 
unnecessary escalation of disasters. Collaboration is essential to reach their common goals.  
Nevertheless, disasters often create a strong desire for someone to take charge, or possibly to 
be held accountable. Such thoughts can be created by a tendency of hindsight and can create 
blindness to the advantages of collaborative action. There are pressing matters in emergency 
management that help drive collaboration, but the expectations from society, tendency of 
hindsight discussions and the great responsibility resting on emergency response workers puts 
pressure on the kind of security promised by a commanding leader (Waugh & Streib, 2006). 
By introducing shared standard operational procedures it may be easier to divide clear areas 
of responsibility. It can also provide a form of check-list for the person preforming the tasks, 
as well as give the other operational leaders a way to double check if things have been done. 
This might encourage collaboration at the same time as someone can be held responsible for 
each task.   
Another aspect that might be influenced by the collaboration is the decision making 
process and shared operational picture. According to Kerr (2004) decision making in a group 
can often lessen the chance of human error. Also, the decision will be based on a complete 
information picture.  This emphasizes the importance of the inter-agency collaboration 
between operational leaders allowing for information flows between the units. The 
collaboration and information sharing between the emergency units can increase the chance of 
the operational commander creating a shared understanding of the situation. Shared situation 
awareness is important for team members to know which information needs to be shared, to 
know which devices that are available for sharing the information, the ability to interpret 
information in the same way, and the process of sharing information (Bolstad & Endsley, 
2000). It should therefore be facilitated for collaboration through shared education and clear 
guidelines for collaboration between the various units. It is also important to create a culture 
that promotes collaboration and clarifying the benefits of collaboration for all agencies. This 
culture must be secured at the top of each unit to give it priority in funding and in time for 
interaction (Bronstein, 2003). As this is political and financial topics it is natural to move on 
to the next part of the discussion, which concentrates on the facilitation for collaboration from 
the agencies, political quarters and from society in general. 
In order to be able to obtain an effective collaboration across agencies and jurisdiction, it 
is important to prioritize this area at the agency level, political level and in society in general. 
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On the agency level this might be done by focusing on joint training (Streichert, 2005) and 
common education (Hall & Weaver, 2001). According to Waugh and Streib (2006) it is 
important to create bonds between the operational leaders from the different units in order to 
improve verbal and non-verbal communication between them. This was backed up by 
statements made by some of the informants in this study.  It is not given that everyone knows 
how to collaborate. When combined with the challenge of collaborating with professionals 
from other disciplines it may be beneficial with training and formal as well as informal 
gatherings to learn about the other agencies' work methods, resources and disciplines. The 
agencies may also facilitate for collaboration with common evaluations after small and larger 
incidents and training exercises (Håndbok for redningstjenesten, 2008). These are all elements 
that are dependent upon financial support from the political and social quarters. It might 
therefore be important to consider how much resources society should use on emergency 
response in peace time. Is it realistic that Norway should have that same preparedness in the 
whole country? First of all there are different needs in different parts of the country. Oslo 
have embassies, the castle, subways and a larger amount of people than other places, areas 
around the oil platforms and industrial areas have explosives, the need for boats and 
environmental issues, in the north of Norway there are larger distances and snow and darkness 
at a larger part of the year. All these issues demands specific attention and might suggest that 
different parts of the country should have customized solutions for their particular needs. 
Another concern is if the large distances between many places in the country which makes it 
possible to defend the acquisition of resources such as helicopters, airplanes and 
snowmobiles. These resources can be distributed and shared across the country, but that again 
requires collaboration across the different jurisdictions. 
Limitations 
 Throughout this study choices have been made that might have affected the results. 
Limitations in this study might be based on the theory, the sample and the choice of methods. 
As this study is based on the FORSTÅTT check-list and the interdisciplinary collaboration 
model, it is important that these frameworks have been understood and used in the right way. 
The FORSTÅTT check-list has never before been tested empirically or practically. It is 
therefore possible that the way FORSTÅTT has been operationalized in this study has placed 
too little emphasis on the phases or elements of the categories were over or under interpreted. 
That might affect the reliability. The article is not specific about how following these 
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procedures will improve collaboration, it is therefore possible that the framework is unsuitable 
for this form of study.  
The interdisciplinary collaboration model is developed based on social work theory 
from the United States of America. The fact that the model is developed based on another 
field and another country might influence the suitability of the model for capturing the 
collaboration between the emergency services.  
This study has been performed on operational leaders from the three emergency units 
in Oslo and the sounding areas. This sample can be a bit too limited to generalize for the 
whole of Norway, which may mean that the results of this study have a limited value in use. 
Another limitation might be connected to the choice to use a mixed-method approach. 
The mixed-models method is a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. The data 
gathering process consists of open ended interview questions based on the SWOT framework. 
SWOT interviews are sensitive of the reflection of the informant and the domain knowledge 
they possesses. If an informant has a high level of domain knowledge but a low level of 
reflection you might get fewer answers When using this method the qualitative data has to be 
transformed in to quantifiable units that can be analyzed statistically. The transforming of the 
data happens through transcriptions of the interviews, unitizing into meaningful statements 
and transferred in to SPSS. After the statements have been transferred into SPSS, the data is 
coded into the theoretical frameworks. In this process there are many opportunities for 
interpretation, which might weaken the reliability. To ensure the reliability there was 
performed an inter-reliability test from the unitizing process, but based on time constraints 
there were not performed an inter-reliability test for the coding. This might lead to an over or 
under coding into the categories or affect the reliability.  
The results were mainly found through analysis of the prevalence of statements. But 
the frequency of statements does not always reflect how important the topic is for the 
participant. The lack of statements within a category does not necessarily mean that the 
category is not important for the interaction. A single statement may emphasize a very 
important point, while ten statements may describe topics that are less important. Therefore, 




There is still a need for a better understanding of the multi-agency collaboration between 
emergency units, even though some research has been conducted in closely related fields (e.g. 
Bolstad & Endsley, 2003; Simo & Bies, 2007; Smith, 2006).  
One of the aspects that should be looked further into is the emergency response units place 
in the multi-, cross- and interdisciplinary collaboration debate. As the terms are somewhat 
unclear, and sometimes contradicting, it is difficult to place emergency response collaboration 
within one of them. A greater understanding of the form of collaboration the emergency 
response units are engaged in might clarify the field for future researchers and clarify which 
part of the existing literature that can be applied to emergency response studies. Another 
suggestion for further studies is whether an extended collaboration model based on 
FORSTÅTT, the interdisciplinary collaboration model and the residual categories would 
account for a significantly part of the collaboration between emergency response personnel.  
A third aspect that should be researched further is the advantages and disadvantages of 
response units’ collaboration. With a further knowledge about the advantages and 
disadvantages of multi-agency collaboration it would be possible to make training programs 
based on this information.  
A fourth aspect is the possibility to further development of Bronsteins (2003) model for 
interdisciplinary collaboration. The main aspect to be improved is the scope of the 
interdependence category. The category includes relic on others to accomplish goals and 
tasks, clear roles, respect for others opinions, informal gathering and communication. This 
high frequency of the interdependence category might indicate that the scope of this category 
is too wide. The suggestion is therefore to investigate the possibility of dividing this category 
in to two categories, possibly interaction and communication.  
A sixed topic for further studies are whether an extended collaboration model based on 
FORSTÅTT, the interdisciplinary collaboration model and the residual categories would 
account for a significantly part of the collaboration between emergency response personnel. 
The last proposal for further studies is to extend this study to a larger part of Norway or 
possibly Scandinavia to see if the same tendencies appear. This could be done by using the 
index of interdisciplinary collaboration (IIC) created by Bronstein (2002). Altercation would 





In this study, the inter-agency collaboration between emergency response leaders have 
been examined base on two different frameworks; one was a set of shared operational 
procedures based on existing operational procedures from all three emergency units, the other 
an interdisciplinary collaboration model created in the social worker field based on existing 
theories about collaboration.  It would seem that both frameworks used in this study were 
unable to explain the whole collaboration process in ICP. The interdisciplinary collaboration 
model was able to account for more than the FORSTÅTT check-list, and combined they 
covered 1516 statements out of 1649. There were topics that were not captured by either of 
the frameworks that might be of great importance to the collaboration process. Examples are 
social expectations, the commitment and experience of individuals and technological tools.  
These results demonstrate the complex nature of inter-agency collaboration in the emergency 
response domain. There is a great need for a better understanding of this field as more 
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APPENDIX A: INFORMATION LETTER 
 
 Informasjonsskriv til deltakere november 2011  
 
Takk for at du har vist interesse for å delta i dette forskningsprosjektet.  
Vi er tre masterstudenter innen Arbeids- og Organisasjonspsykologi ved Universitetet i Oslo 
som skriver oppgave for SINTEF, som leder BRIDGE prosjektet. I forbindelse med våre 
masteroppgaver ønsker vi å intervjue operative ledere fra helse, innsatsledere fra politi og 
fagledere fra brann, som har erfaringer fra en eller flere større krisehendelser.  
 
BRIDGE-prosjektet  
BRIDGE er et EU-finansiert prosjekt som har som mål å øke sikkerhet gjennom å utvikle 
tekniske og organisatoriske løsninger, for å forbedre håndtering av kriser og katastrofer. 
Fokuset ligger blant annet på samarbeid på tvers av etater og landegrenser ved store 
krisehendelser som terroranslag, naturkatastrofer og industriulykker. Prosjektet skal medføre 
økt sikkerhet og trygghet for befolkningen i Europa gjennom fler-faglig nødetatskoordinering 
og ledelse ved storskala akutthendelser. For mer informasjon om BRIDGE-prosjektet, se 
http://www.bridgeproject.eu/.  
 
Mål med forskningen: Vi vil fokusere på ILKO bestående av operative ledere fra de tre 
blålysetatene, og se på koordinering, kommunikasjon, informasjonsbehov og 
beslutningsprosesser. Formålet er å teste vitenskapelige modeller, prosedyrer og «best 
practice» i krisesituasjoner.  
 
Hvordan du kan forberede deg  
Vi er interessert i dine personlige meninger og erfaringer når vi intervjuer deg, ikke andres 
tanker. Vi ber deg forberede deg på følgende spørsmål:  
 
Hvilke styrker ser du ved måten du tar beslutninger i ILKO i dag?  
Hvilke svakheter ser du ved måten du tar beslutninger i ILKO i dag?  
Hva kan på sikt være utfordringer knyttet til beslutninger du tar i ILKO?  
Hvilke muligheter ser du for at du kan ta bedre beslutninger i ILKO i fremtiden?  
Hvilke styrker ser du ved måten du samhandler i ILKO?  
Hvilke svakheter ser du ved måten du samhandler i ILKO?  
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Hva kan på sikt kan være utfordringer ved samhandlingen i ILKO?  
Hvilke muligheter ser du for at samhandlingen i ILKO kan bli mer effektiv i fremtiden?  
 
Deltakelse  
Intervjuet vil foregå på norsk. Vi vil være to stykker tilstede ved intervjuet, der en intervjuer, 
og den andre observerer og kommer med eventuelle oppfølgingsspørsmål. Vi regner med at 
intervjuet vil ta ca. 1,5 til 2 timer, inkludert pause.  
 
Håndtering av datamaterialet og konfidensialitet  
I henhold til etiske retningslinjer for forskning er din deltakelse i studiet frivillig. Du kan når 
som helst trekke deg fra intervjuet og studiet uten å oppgi noen grunn. Intervjuet vil bli tatt 
opp på bånd, og deretter transkribert. Deler vil også oversettes til engelsk. Dette vil gjøre det 
lettere for oss å analysere data i ettertid og sikre korrekt gjengivelse av det du sier. 
Informasjonen du oppgir kan også være av interesse for Bridge forskere fra andre land, kun 
forskere i Bridge vil få tilgang til datamaterialet. Transkripsjonene vil beholdes i anonymisert 




Med mange takk,  
 




APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM 
 
Samtykkeskjema for å delta i EU prosjektet Bridge 
Ved å signere dette skjema bekrefter du at du har mottatt informasjon om prosedyrene og 
detaljer rundt prosjektet, at du har fått tilstrekkelig mulighet til å vurdere denne 
informasjonen, og at du frivillig vil delta i prosjektet. Du vil motta en kopi av dette 
samtykkeskjema. 
Jeg bekrefter at jeg har lest og forstått “Informasjonsskriv november 2011” for 
Bridge prosjektet.  
Jeg har hatt muligheten til å vurdere denne informasjonen, og fått tilfredsstillende 
svar på spørsmål vedrørende forskningen.   
Jeg sier meg villig til å delta i intervjuet og forstår at min deltakelse er frivillig.   
Jeg forstår at jeg når som helst kan trekke meg som deltaker, uten å matte oppgi 
noen grunn.  
Jeg er innforstått med at informasjonen jeg gir vil bli behandlet konfidensielt av 
alle forskerne.  
Jeg tillater at mine svar blir tatt opp på lydbånd. 
 
 
Jeg forstår at all data som samles inn vil bli behandlet anonymt, med pseudonym.   
Jeg tillater at dere referer til meg som «Operativ leder»  






















SIGNATUR til deltaker: _______________________     
 









APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW GUIDE  
Info før intervju 
 
 Kort intro om: 
o Masteroppgaven: tre masteroppgaver om samhandling, kommunikasjon og 
beslutninger. Skriver for SINTEF som leder BRIDGE-prosjektet. 
o BRIDGE: prosjekt som har som mål å utvikle metoder og teknologi for å bedre 




o Kan bli noe likt, mulig vi må be deg repetere. 
 




Jeg vil først høre litt som samhandlingen i ILKO slik den er pr. i dag: 
Hvilke styrker ser du ved måten du samhandler i ILKO? 
 
Jeg er fortsatt interessert i dagens samhandling, men ønsker nå å høre litt om: 




Med tanke på dagens praksis så ønsker jeg nå å se litt fremover i tid: 
Hva kan på sikt kan være utfordringer ved samhandlingen i ILKO? 
 
Fortsatt med tanke på fremtiden: 
Hvilke muligheter ser du for at samhandlingen i ILKO kan bli mer effektiv i fremtiden? 







- Hva mener du? 
- Hva da? 
- Kan du utdype det? 
- Har du et eksempel på det? 
- Du nevnte….., kan du si noe mer om det? 
 
Flere S/W/O/T: 
- Du har allerede nevnt noen styrker/svakheter/positive/negative sider ved samhandling. 
Hvilke andre S/W/O/T gjelder her? 



















Hvordan synes du det gikk? 
 















APPENDIX D: TRANSCRIBING PROCEDURES 
De overordnede retningslinjer for transkribering er: 
1. Tilpasse transkribering til formål med undersøkelsen 
2. Konsistens (reliabilitet) 
3. Åpenhet (vi beskriver hva vi har gjort) 
 
Når det gjelder selve transkriberingen er det disse retningslinjene som gjelder: 
 Vi skriver på bokmål 
 Vi skriver det som blir sagt, ordrett 
 Vi setter punktum ved naturlige pauser 
 Vi tar med gjentakelser 
 Vi skriver inn ¨Mmm¨og ¨Eh¨når dette er markert 
 Dersom noe er uklart markeres dette med uklart tidspunkt i bold 
o Vi frastår fra å gjette/tolke hva som blir sagt 
o Ved tilfeller hvor flere snakker samtidig markeres dette med uklart dersom det 
ikke lar seg gjøre å forså hva som blir sagt 
 Intervjuer markeres med Int.1 (eventuelt Int.2), etterfulgt av innrykk 
 Respondent markeres med forkortelse av tittel (eksempel: etterforskningsleder: EFL), 
etterfulgt av innrykk 
 Pauser, og andre verbale uttrykk som latter, hosting etc blir ikke markert fordi dette er 




- Noterer … når en person tenker eller ikke fullfører en setning 
- Notere et tidsstempel for hvert femte, tiende, femtende, osv. minutt. Notere 
tidsstempel i et snakkebytte mellom intervjuer og intervjuobjekt (nærmest hvert femte 
minutt). 
  





APPENDIX E: UNITIZING PROCEDURES  
 
Mål med unitizing: 
Målet med unitizing er å isolere meninger fra hverandre. Meningsfulle ytringer må forstås i 
seg selv. Vi må forme kortest mulige enheter med deler av eksempel/spørsmål for å klargjøre 
poenget. 
 
Definisjon meningsfylt ytring: Så korte utsagn som mulig, men fortsatt meningsfulle. 
The best content analyses define their context units as large as is meaningful (adding to their 
validity) and as small as is feasible (adding to their reliability) (Krippendorf, 2004) 
Typer utsagn: 
Vi har møtt på følgende type utsagn. Eksemplifisering av disse kommer lenger nede. 
1. Et avgrenset og meningsfylt utsagn (statement). 
2. En nyansert beskrivelse av et overordnet tema. 
3. Eksemplifiseringer som bærer mening i og for seg. 
4. Eksemplifiseringer som forbereder eller følger opp et statement  
5. Premisser for et kommende eller allerede uttalt poeng/ytring 
6. Eksempler beskriver i fortid i kontrast eller likhet til nåværende tilstand  
7. Utsagn ikke knyttet til tematikk eller tema (”Northug er kongen!!!”) – irrelevante 
utsagn,  
 
1. Et avgrenset og meningsfylt utsagn (statement) 
Hvordan vi vurderer avgrensning av meningsfylte utsagn 
 Vi ser det som et nytt utsagn ved tematisk brudd.  
o Et poeng/mening = et nytt tema, nye aktører, nye sider ved saken. 
o Eksempel: «frisk luft, frisk luft, mosjon, frisk luft» - statement «frisk luft», 
«mosjon», «frik luft».’ 
 Vi deler i to statements der hvor det er mulig å dele uten å miste mening. 
 Vi må vurdere statements ift bottom up og top down (SWOT og andre modeller) 
hvis i tvil. Så lite som mulig føringer fra top-down. 
 
2. En nyansert beskrivelse av et overordnet tema 
 
Ved store, generelle temaer lager vi også mindre statements av undertemaer. 
 En mening som gjentas og nyanseres må unitizes som en egen enhet. 
o eksempel:  





 Store/generelle temaer: kommunikasjon 
 Mindre statements: ikke verbal kommunikasjon, ansikt til ansikt 
kommunikasjon, dialog, radio etc. 
 KUN når han nevner flere underkategorier, da skilles det til flere 
enheter. Også hvis det skilles med «og» i en setning. Hvis ikke er 
det del av eksempelet («i forhold til» uten «og», «fordi», «det vil 
si», «som gjør at».) 
Bruk av klammer: 
 Legge til informasjon fra spørsmål/eksempler i setninger rundt i klammer for å 
klargjøre meningsfulle ytringer. 
 Hvis det refereres til «det/den/dette» o.l., må det eksemplifisere med klamme. 
For eksempel ved svar på spørsmål må det refereres til deler avl spørsmålet 
stilt. 
 
3. Eksemplifiseringer som bærer mening i og for seg. 
 
Hvordan vi vurderer eksempler som meningsfylte utsagn. 
 Et eksempel som har et poeng men som ikke uttales/konkretiseres markeres i blått 
for å senere vurdere/konkretisere i SPSS. 
 Hvis i tvil om man skal kode eksempel som en statement, ta med til hverandre og 
diskuter. 
 
4. Eksemplifiseringer som forbereder eller følger opp et statement : 
 Alle eksemplifiseringer som understøtter/forløper en statement. 
o Følger opp/understøtter: Poeng tatt opp i neste setning, derfor kategorisert 
som eksempel.  
o Forbereder/forløper: Poeng tatt opp i setninger før, men konkretisert i 
senere statement. 
o Eventuelt legge til deler av eksempelet i klammer for å tydeliggjøre 
statement. 
 Disse utsagnene blir skrevet i egne setninger i SPSS, og refererer tilbake til 
statements. 
o De skal puttes inn i SPSS som statements, men kodes som eksempel i SPSS 
i stede for på modeller. De kodes i egen kolonne «eksempel» som 1, der 
statements blir kodet som 2. 
 
5. Premisser for et kommende eller allerede uttalt poeng/ytring 
Bakgrunnsinformasjon/kontekst, premisser som understøtter et poeng.  





 Eksempel: «Vi har nødnett.»  
o Hvordan det påvirker samhandling/beslutning blir gjerne utdypet, og DET 
blir en statement. 
 Inkludere premissen i utsagnet for å gjøre det mer forståelig. Men er premissen 
veldig lang blir det unitizet i grått. 
 
6. Eksempler beskriver i fortid i kontrast eller likhet til nåværende tilstand  
 
7. Utsagn ikke knyttet til tematikk eller tema 
 Skal ikke inn i SPSS. 
  Men de skal telles slik at vi vet hvor mye irrelevant som er tatt ut. 
 Fjerne fyllord og lydord 
o  «dette er en svakhet»/»Det er en liten utfordring da»? 
o «Eeeh» 
 Fjerne ufullstendige setninger som ikke gir mening i seg selv. 
8. Utsagn som ikke blir fullført 
 Setninger som ikke blir fullført eller fulgt opp, og ikke gir mening i seg selv. 
Når det er lange eksempler kan det være lurt å se om det har blitt tatt opp før i samme 
eksempel og om det tilfører nye elementer eller bare gjentar de. 
 Fargekoding i transkripsjonene: 
Hele teksten skal fargekodes i enheter, men unntak av det intervjuer sier. 
Meningsfulle ytringer: gul/grønn/turkis 
Eksempler og utbroderinger: grå (to nyanser hvis ulike eksempler rett etter hverandre) 
Eksempel-units: mørkeblå 
Statements vi er usikre på: rød skrift, legges inn i SPSS , med ref. til plassering i teksten og 
begrunnelse. Begrunnelse og videre kommentarer legges inn i kommentarfeltet i SPSS bak 
hver statement. 
Ytringer som ikke er relevante for tematikken: i rosa. Skal ikke inn i SPSS.  
Gjennomføring av unitizing 
- Lese gjennom en gang og skille enheter fra hverandre, deretter lese gjennom en gang 
til for å få helheten og sile ut eventuelle «ekstra-statements» 
o f.eks: «statement» eksempel «statement», der begge statements er like og 
dermed den ene blir støttende setning. 
- Der det er skrivefeil eller ord ikke hører hjemme (ulogisk setning), hør gjennom 
lydfilen. Gjør deretter endringer i den unitizede filen, og marker denne endringen i 





bold. Etter at vi er ferdig med å unitize alle intervju, gå tilbake til den originale 
transkripsjonen og gjør nødvendige endringer. 




 To SPSS filer – en for beslutninger og en for samhandling 
 En deltaker har samme tall i begge SPSS filene 
 Vi har to SPSS filer hver som vi slår sammen til slutt til to (beslutninger og 
samhandling) 
 Der eksempler som hører til statements, skriver man nummeret på statement 
foran eksempelteksten  i parantes 
o «(3) For eksempel, nå…» 
 Stjerne (*) før statement hvis man har skrevet en kommentar. 
 Deler av statement som er i fokus (hvis setningen gjentas) i CAPS LOCK. 
 Legge til informasjon (eks. for «det») i klammer for å klargjøre meningsfulle 
ytringer. 
 
Tips til andre som unitizer: marker i kommentarfeltet når det begynnes å snakkes om 
styrker/svakheter/muligheter/trusler 
  





APPENDIX F: CODING PROCEDURES  
 
- Alle statements I SPSS skal kodes på de ulike modellene. 
o Eksempler skal ikke kodes. Eksemplene blir fjernet fra analysen ved å bruke 
«Exclude» funksjon i SPSS. 
- En statement kan kun kodes i én sub-kategori (eks. F) i hver modell (eks. FORSTÅTT) 
- Passer ikke statement inn i en kategori i en modell skal den kodes som «Residual» 
 
Ved koding av enheter som bør deles/slås sammen: 
- Dele opp statement i to? 
o legge nederst i SPSS filen til informanten. 
o Skriv i kommentarfeltet til den delen som blir igjen «statement følger i …» 
 Eksempel: «statement følger 123» 
o Skriv i kommentarfeltet til den som legges nederst «følger under statement …» 
 Eksempel: «følger under statement 25» 
- To statements blir ett? – lage den ene som eksempel 
- Gjentakelse – kode som eksempel, skrive begrunnelse i kommentarfeltet. 
 
FORSTÅTT operasjonalisering 
 Ta utgangspunkt i FORSTÅTT – tittel og forklaring. 
 Hvis i tvil på hvor statement hører hjemme, se på fasene. 




F = Forberedelse:  
- Eksisterende kunnskap og erfaring 
- Tenke over nødvendig utstyr og ressurser. 
- Tenke over vær og omgivelser. 
- Tenke gjennom sikkerhetsspørsmål (planlegging) – hvilke farer eksisterer. 
- Planlegge og lage strategi for videre gjennomføring. Gjennom etablerte tiltakskort 
og planlegging på vei til åstedet. 
- Etablere kontakt med andre operative ledere i ILKO. 
- Eksempler: 









O = Opplysninger, oppmarsj og organisering/ledelse 
- Skaffe opplysninger og informasjon på vei til skadestedet 
- Tenke stort og skaffe nok ressurser 
- Kommunikasjon med alarmsentralene 
- Ha en plan for oppmarsj klart (f.eks. plassering av biler og andre ressurser)  
- Danne ILKO og andre lederfunksjoner 
- Kommunisere klart og tydelig i begynnelsen av innsatsen. 
- Eksempler: 
o «Men når ting hast og du må ta avgjørelser fort, så så så den st…. det er en 
styrke å ha de de to i andre i ILKO.» 
o Støtte seg på andre i ILKO 
o nei det må jo være egentlig på vei til skadestedet, at man kan få en 
oppdatering 
3.  
R = risikovurdering, rekognosering og ressurser 
- Risiko-/ sikkerhetsvurdering for seg selv og andre (mannskap, pasienter, og ev. 
miljø og verdier) 
o Eksempel: «eeeh kan utgjøre fare for personellet og selvfølgelig s.. s.. 
sivile.» 
- Skaffe riktig situasjonsforståelse 
- Rekognosering sammen med de andre lederne i ILKO for å forstå hverandres 
behov og for å ikke mist hverandre. 
- Skaffe nødvendige ressurser 
- Proaktiv ressursvurdering (skaffe nødvendige ressurser for nå og fremover)  
- Varsle andre nødetater og interessenter (Røde Kors, eksperter, NSB, grunneiere 
osv. 
- Skaffe/knytte til seg ressurser/interessenter 
- Ta med responstid i betraktning (til andre interessenter) 
- Eksempler: 
o «Fordi at det tar tid. Det tar tid å få en person fram når hele byen står på 
hodet så så skal også denne personen da som ikke kjører utrykning, ikke 
har tilgang på blålys, eeeh komme til vår posisjon eeeh og tilby sin tjeneste 
og det er ikke lett, det tar fryktelig lang tid.» 
o Alene i ILKO 
o Tar høyde for risiko-situasjoner i fremtiden 
4.  
S = sikring og situasjonsrapport. 
- Sikre mot nåværende og fremtidige trusler. 
o Eksempel: Når man utfører ift risiko-situasjoner, faktiske tiltak. 
- Være forutseende og ikke reaktiv og hendelsesstyrt. 
- Gi situasjonsrapport til egen operasjonssentral 
- Gi og innhente god, riktig og tidskritisk informasjon til/fra sentralen og personer 
på ulykkesstedet. 
- Eksempel:  
o Handler om informasjonstilgang ved drift 





o «ja asså hver etat sitter jo på sin spisskompetanse. Vi har helse og tilbyr alt 
det helse innebærer inn i ILKO. Eeeh politi og brann selvfølgelig sine, 
eeeh, i et branntilfelle så vil de kunne fortelle oss hva er det som brenner, 
hvor farlig er det som brenner, hva slags miljø eeeh, kan det skape for oss 
der vi er, eeeh og samme med politiet som da tilbyr sine kunnskaper om om 
fare og om eeeh sikring og sånne ting.» 
- Justering av ressurser etter behov (egne ressurser) 
5.  
T = triage (prioritering) 
- Prioritering av pasienter så alle får riktig behandling til riktig tid 
- Prioritering av liv, deretter verdier og miljø 
- Riktige tiltak i rett rekkefølge til rett tid 
- Eksempel: 
o «For da er det å samhandle i forhold til hva skal prioriteres først, hva er 
mest kritisk?» 
6.  
Å = åstedshåndtering 
- Videreføring og drift av det operative arbeidet med ulykken. 
- God oversikt over situasjonen 
- Klare roller og ansvar (alle vet hva de skal gjøre) 
- Kommunikasjon, Koordinering og Kontroll. 
- Eksempler: 
o «styrkene er det at du har to andre etater som dekker det du ikke håndterer 
selv» 
o Drift på den hendelsen– «Vanskeligere arbeidsforhold» 
o Ikke kjent med rollen som operativ leder i ILKO 
7.  
T = tiltak på pasient (Behandling) 
- Etter triage, gi fysisk og psykisk førstehjelp til alle involverte  
 
8.  
T = transport til sykehus 
- Starte transporten av kritiske pasienter til sykehus så tidlig som mulig. 
- Kontakt med AMK (som melder til sykehus) angående transport med pasienter 
- Etablere samarbeid mellom samleplass og evakueringskontrollpunkt 
9.  
Residual (fylt inn etterhvert som de dukket opp) 
- Mellommenneskelige relasjoner.  
o Kjennskap til andre 
o Handlingsmønstre 
o «verdien og styrken, asså styrken er tillit» 
o «Du er blant folk du føler du kan stole på og og snakke fritt.» 
- Eksterne elementer 
o Økonomi 
o Teknologi som en ikke har 





o Samfunnsendringer utenfor deres kontroll 
o Organisering 
 «Men generelt sett der de prioriterer den type funksjon da, sånn som 
her i Oslo for eksempel så er det en veldig stabil eeeh gjeng.» 
- Etterarbeidsfasen  
o Evaluering 
o Erfaringsoverføring  
- Bruke hverandres ressurser 
- Ulike etater som premissgivere 
o Dette kan også gå under Å hvis det står i sammenheng med klare roller og 
ansvar. Men burde diskuteres i diskusjonsdelen.  
- Media 
- Justere beslutninger underveis / viktigheten av å ta en beslutning 
«du har en, og du har også en en beslutningsstøtte som er veldig viktig»  
 
Samhandlings modell operasjonalisering  
1. Gjensidig avhengighet  
 Gjensidige avhengigheten oppstår når ulike yrker er avhengige av samhandling 
mellom fagmiljøer  
 Hyppig kommunikasjon mellom partene 
 Avhengige av andre for å oppnå sine mål og oppgaver.  
 Må fagfolk ha en klar forståelse av hverandres roller og bruke dem riktig. 
 Gjensidige avhengigheten består vanligvis av formell og uformell samvær, muntlig og 
skriftlig kommunikasjon mellom hverandre 
 Respekt for alle medarbeidere profesjonelle meninger og innspill. 
o Eksempler er når de tre etatene Tilrettelegger for hverandre eller hvem som er 
Premissleverandører 
2. Nye aktiviteter som et resultat av samarbeidet 
 Nyopprettede faglige aktiviteter er når samarbeidende handlinger, programmer og 
strukturer kan oppnå mer enn om de profesjonelle handlet uavhengig.  
 Disse aktivitetene maksimere kompetanse av hver samarbeidspartner. Med andre ord 
samarbeid er når summen er større enn komponentene. 
o Bevegelig KO 
o Skyting pågår i Oslo/Akershus 
3. Fleksibilitet 





 Fleksibilitet er bevisst blanding av roller.  
 Typiske kjennetegn ved fleksibel atferd er å nå produktive kompromisser når de møter 
uenigheter og  
 Kreative løsninger på situasjoner. 
o Brann er innsatsleder til politiet kommer 
4. Feller eierskap av mål  
 Felles ansvar i hele prosessen med å nå målene,  
 blant annet design, definisjon, utvikling og måloppnåelse.  
 Hver fagretning og person må ta ansvar for sin egen del i suksess og fiasko 
 Støtte konstruktiv uenigheter og diskusjoner innad i teamet. 
 Klare definerte realistiske mål, felles forståelse, felles strategi og inkludering av andre 
i beslutningstakingen. Villige til å inngå kompromisser. 
o Klart definerte/ realistiske mål 
o Felles forståelse 
o Felles strategi 
o Beslutningstaking i fellesskap  
o Premissleverandør  
5. Refleksjon rundt prosessen 
 Samarbeidspartnernes oppmerksomhet på deres prosess med å jobbe sammen.  
 Dette inkluderer at samarbeidspartnerne tenker og snakker med hverandre om deres 
samarbeid og prosess,  
 Tilbakemeldinger til hverandre i sin evaluering prosess for å styrke 
samarbeidsrelasjoner og effektivitet. 
6. Profesjonell rolle 
 En sterk følelse av faglig rolle inkluderer å ha verdier og etikk av yrket som inkluderer 
en forpliktelse til Byrået innstillinger, respekt for faglige kolleger og et perspektiv som 
er like eller komplementære til kollegaens perspektiver.  
 Ting som påvirker den profesjonelle rollen er status, hierarki, roller, verdier og 
praksis, og forskjellene mellom de forskjellige etatene blir forsterket av verdien hver 
person legger på autonomi og muligheten til å være selvstyrt. 
o Snakke samme språk 
o Få andres innspill selv om de vet svaret selv (kunnskap om hverandres felt vs 
inkludering) 
7. Strukturelle kjennetegn 





 Dette inkluderer en overkommelig arbeidsmengde, et byrå kultur som støtter 
tverrfaglig samarbeid, administrativ støtte, faglig autonomi, og tid og rom til å gjøre 
samarbeidet til å skje. 
 Økonomi 
o Andre steder i landet 
8. Personlige egenskaper 
 Hvordan samarbeidspartnere ser på hverandre utenfor den profesjonelle rollen 
kollegaene holder.  
 Noen av elementene i personlige egenskaper som kan påvirke samarbeidet er tillit, 
respekt, forståelse eller lignende perspektiver og uformell kommunikasjon mellom 
kollegaer. 
 Følelser rundt det å samarbeide 
9. Samarbeids historie  
 Dette er basert på tidligere erfaring fra tverrfaglige team.  
 Dersom fagfolk har en historie med å jobbe i tverrfaglige team, kan deres erfaring med 
denne type arbeid farge fremtidig samarbeid. 
10. Residual 
 Den tar ikke høyde for forberedelser/opplæring 
 Inkludering av de andre etater 
 Like forutsetninger (teknologi, mannskap, utdanning, tilgang til informasjon++) 
 Nye samarbeidspartnere (eksterne eksperter) 
 
 
 
